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ESSAY

SOME REFLECTIONS ON THE
DEVELOPMENT OF NATIONAL
WILDLIFE LAW AND POLICY AND
THE CONSUMPTIVE USE OF
RENEWABLE WILDLIFE RESOURCES
CONGRESSMAN TOBY ROTH*

STEPHEN S. BOYNTON**
I.

INTRODUCTION

[T]o waste, to destroy, our naturalresources, to skin and exhaust

the land instead of using it so as to increase its usefulness, will result in undermining in the days of our children the very prosperity
which we ought by right to hand down to them amplified and
developed.

-Theodore Roosevelt1
Concerns over our wildlife have not waned since President
Roosevelt's time. On the contrary, the question of what wildlife policy
to adopt has become more pressing than ever before. The importance of
protecting our natural resources demands that our responses be reasoned and farsighted as we move forward to the twenty-first century.
This means relying upon professional and scientific management. If such
management is observed, habitat degradation and destruction relative to
the human demands of our society (the only actual threats to the successful future of the conservation of fish and game) can be controlled.
The excesses of the nineteenth century in the harvest of wildlife shall
never be repeated. Through a myriad of federal and state wildlife laws
* Eight-term member of the U.S. House of Representatives serving the 8th Congressional
District in Wisconsin; Secretary to the Congressional Sportsmen's Caucus; B.A. 1961, Marquette University.
** General Counsel to the Congressional Sportsmen's Caucus Foundation and in private
practice in Washington, D.C.; B.A. 1959, Ohio State University; LL.B. 1965, University of
South Carolina.
1. President Theodore Roosevelt, Seventh Annual Message (Dec. 3, 1907), in THEODORE
RoosEVELT 1858-1919, at 87, 92 (Gilbert J. Black ed., 1969).
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and regulations fostering a conservation policy that includes consumptive use of renewable wildlife resources, most of this nation's fish and
game populations are stable and healthy. There are many dramatic examples of wildlife species that have suffered serious difficulties, but due
to professional wildlife management practices, populations materially increased and became stable. Two species that achieved population recovery are the wood duck and the pronghorn antelope. Scientific wildlife
management has substantially enhanced other wildlife populations as
well. For example, there are probably more white-tail deer and wild turkey in the United States today than when Jamestown was founded in
1607. Wood ducks have been brought back from the edge of extinction,2
Canadian geese populations have almost doubled in the past thirty years,
and Rocky Mountain and Roosevelt Elk populations
have increased dra3
matically since the beginning of the century.
From the very beginning of the formation of this Republic, the consumption of renewable wildlife resources has played an important role in
the commerce, culture, and subsistence of our society. Indeed, the first
European settlements in North America were established to trade in
fur.4 Fish and game provided food and clothing for our pioneering
forebearers; fish, fowl, and wild meat are still significant food sources for
hunters, trappers, fishermen, and native populations. In 1991, forty million people over sixteen years old took to our nation's wilderness areas
to hunt, fish, and trap, fostering a $40.9 billion economic benefit to the
nation and producing millions of jobs.'
This conservation and economic success of the twentieth century
could not have been achieved without the farsightedness of conservationists and sportsmen who sought and secured reasoned laws and regulations for wildlife management. But how did we reach this point in
creating a body of federal wildlife law, and more important, where will
we go with the authority to develop it?

2. FISH & WILDLIFE SERv., U.S. DEP'T OF THE INTERIOR, RESTORING AMERICA'S WILD89-103.
3. Id. at 145-46; 273-78.
4. RICHARD G. VAN GELDER, ANIMALS AND MAN: PAST PRESENT FUTURE 33-36 (1972).

LIFE

5.

U.S.

FISH & WILDLIFE SERV., U.S. DEP'T OF THE INTERIOR AND BUREAU OF THE CENSUS,

DEP'T OF COMMERCE,

1991

ASSOCIATED RECREATION 6

NATIONAL SURVEY OF FISHING, HUNTING AND WILDLIFE -

(1993).
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II.

NATIONAL WILDLIFE LAW AND POLICY
DEVELOPMENT OF THE FEDERAL GOVERNMiENT'S AUTHORITY
OVER WILDLIFE LAW

This nation's federal wildlife law is ultimately rooted in the Constitution through the powers and responsibilities delegated to the executive,
legislative, and judicial branches of government. Under the Tenth
Amendment to the Constitution, those powers not specifically reserved
by the federal government are "reserved to the states,"6 and under that
authority, states have developed their particular wildlife laws and
regulations.
The evolution of our federal wildlife law has generally advanced
through social and cultural forces stemming from Greek and Roman traditions and Anglo-Saxon law that, in turn, have influenced statutes and
regulations in the common law as interpreted by the courts.
There are basically three areas from which the federal government
derives its powers under the Constitution to enable the development of
any body of federal wildlife law:
7
1. the exclusive federal power to regulate interstate commerce;
2. the exclusive federal power to enter into treaties;8 and
3. the exclusive federal power to regulate and control activity on
federal lands.'
As clear as these powers may seem, all have been challenged on the
basis of our federated system of government.
For example, on August 16, 1916, the United States concluded a
treaty with Great Britain (on behalf of Canada) for the protection of
migratory birds. 10 The constitutionality of the Act implementing the
treaty was immediately challenged on the ground that the states, not the
federal government, should have exclusive jurisdiction over resident
wildlife. In Missouri v. Holland," the United States Supreme Court
firmly established that, under the Supremacy Clause of the Constitution,

6. U.S. CONST. amend. X.
7. Id.art. I, § 8, cl. 3 ("The Congress shall have Power... To regulate Commerce with
foreign Nations, and among the several States ....).
8. Id.art. VI ("This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be made
in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the Authority of
the United States, shall be the Supreme Law of the Land ....).
2 ("The Congress shall have the power to dispose of and make all
9. Id.art. IV,§ 3, cl.
needful Rules and Regulations respecting the Territory or other Property belonging to the
United States ....
").
10. Convention for the Protection of Migratory Birds, Aug. 16, 1916, U.S.-Gr. Brit., 39
Stat. 1702.
11. 252 U.S. 416 (1920).
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the treaty and implementing legislation took precedence over any conflict between state and federal regulation.
Prior to Holland, and exclusive of treaty considerations, the courts
had struggled with the question of who had the property rights in the
wildlife-the states or the federal government? And, if it was the states,
could any body of federal wildlife law ever be developed?
One of the earliest cases to explore the issue of wildlife ownership
and, therefore, ultimate jurisdiction for regulation and legislation, was
the 1842 case of Martin v. Waddell.12 The issue presented to the Court
was the right of a riparian landowner to prohibit others from taking oysters from mud flats on the Raritan River in New Jersey. The property
owner claimed ownership in both the riparian and submerged lands in
the river and based his title on the grant from King Charles II of England to the Duke of York. Reaching beyond a mere interpretation of
title to property, Chief Justice Taney reviewed the deed as "an instrument upon which was to be founded the institutions of a great political
community."' 3 Based upon a historical review of the British law, the
Court held that the King could not have transferred title to the property
to the Duke (and ultimately to the plaintiff), because "dominion and
property in navigable waters, and in the lands under them [were] held by
the King as a public trust" and because the King could not make a private grant of such lands and waters under the terms of the Magna Carta
signed in 1215.14
The Court further observed that when the State of New Jersey "took
possession of the reins of government... the prerogatives and regalities
which before belonged either to the crown or the parliament, became
immediately and rightfully vested in the state."' 5 With this judicial
framework, the concept of state ownership of wildlife was initiated.
The next judicial consideration to be addressed was the potential
conflict between developing state law regulating wildlife and the exclu-6
sive power of the federal government to regulate interstate commerce.1
The Supreme Court addressed that issue under a variety of factual patterns and consistently upheld the prerogatives of the state to regulate its
fish and resident wildlife.' 7 Contrary to this trend was the 1896 case of
41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 345 (1842).
Id. at 350.
Id. at 349.
Id. at 354.
16. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
17. See, e.g., Manchester v. Massachusetts, 139 U.S. 240 (1891); McCready v. Virginia, 94
U.S. 391 (1876); Smith v. Maryland, 53 U.S. (18 How.) 71 (1855).
12.
13.
14.
15.
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Geer v. Connecticut,'" which traced the state ownership theory from
Greek and Roman law, the civil law of Europe, and the common law of
England. Justice Edward White, writing for the majority, declared that
the states had the power "to control and regulate the common property
in game... as a trust for the benefit of the people."'19 As for interstate
commerce, the Court stated that as long as it was affected "remotely and
indirectly.., the duty of the State to preserve for its people a valuable
food supply" was a proper exercise of the police powers of the state.20
From Geer, the courts analyzed state ownership versus the constitutional right of the federal government in terms of degree of impact on
interstate commerce and the state's obligation to hold wildlife in trust.
However, Congress initiated its first step in the development of a body
law only four years after Geer with the passage of the Lacey
of federal
21
Act.
The Lacey Act based its authority on the exclusive federal power to
regulate commerce between the states.' This Act prohibited the interstate transportation of "fish or wildlife" taken in violation of state law.3
Clearly, the regulatory power of the states over wildlife was materially
enhanced by Geer, but the Lacey Act specifically invoked the powers of
the Commerce Clause to establish federal jurisdiction. Not until seventy-seven years later in Douglas v. Seacoast Products, Inc.24 did the
Supreme Court firmly establish that the Commerce Clause would and
could be invoked to establish federal jurisdiction over resident state
wildlife when "there is some effect on interstate commerce. '
Two years later, Douglas was reinforced by Hughes v. Oklahoma.26
In that case, where a state statute discriminated against interstate commerce, the Court held that "[t]he definition of 'commerce' is the same
when relied on to strike down or restrict state legislation as when relied
on to support some exertion of federal control or regulation."'2 7 The
Court observed that "time has revealed the error"' of the rationale con18. 161 U.S. 519 (1896).
19. Id. at 528-29.

20. I& at 534.
21.
(1988)
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.

Ch. 553, 31 Stat. 187 (1900) (codified as amended at 16 U.S.C. §§ 701, 3371-3378
and 18 U.S.C. § 42 (1988)).
See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
16 U.S.C. § 3372(a) (1988).
431 U.S. 265 (1977).
Id at 281-82 (emphasis added).
441 U.S. 322 (1979).
Id. at 326 n.2.
Id- at 326.
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tained in Geer. Although the Court recognized the legitimate state concern for conservation and protection of wildlife, Hughes clearly indicated
that the Court would not continue to consider wildlife any different than
other natural resources that entered into interstate commerce.
Based on the concept that the states had ownership in their own wildlife, the right of the federal government to regulate wildlife on federal
lands has also been challenged. The 1928 case of Hunt v. United States2 9

challenged the right of the Secretary of Agriculture to remove an excess
population of deer in a national forest. The state relied upon the Geer
rationale, but the Court ruled that "the power of the United States to

thus protect its land and property does not admit of doubt.., the game
laws or any other statute of the state ... notwithstanding."" °

It seems clear today that the courts have little difficulty in upholding
the federal power of the Property Clause in regulating wildlife on federal
lands. 31 Although the courts will still review the degree of impact of
state law and regulation upon interstate commerce relative to state concern for conservation of fish and resident game,32 it seems clear that
state interests will not supersede federal prerogatives involved in interstate commerce.
Thus, the powers of the federal government under the Constitution

as interpreted by the courts permitted a body of federal wildlife law to

29. 278 U.S. 96 (1928).
30. Id. at 100. The federal government exercised this power as early as 1894 when it
prohibited hunting in Yellowstone National Park. Act of May 7, 1894, ch. 72, 28 Stat. 73
(current version at 16 U.S.C. § 26 (1988)).
31. See, e.g., Palila v. Hawaii Dep't of Land & Natural Resources, 471 F. Supp. 985 (D.
Haw. 1979), affd, 639 F.2d 495 (9th Cir. 1981) (upholding the Endangered Species Act as it
covered nonmigratory species on state land while suggesting that preserving a national resource such as an endangered species may be enough to rise to the level of a federal property
interest); see also United States v. Brown, 552 F.2d 817 (8th Cir. 1977) (upholding federal
prohibition of hunting on state waters within, but not part of, a national park under the Property Clause powers); New Mexico State Game Comm'n v. Udall, 410 F.2d 1197 (10th Cir.
1968), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 961 (1969) (holding that damage to wildlife need not be shown in
order to regulate the wildlife).
32. As stated in Hughes: "The extent of the burden that will be tolerated will of course
depend on the nature of the local interest involved, and on whether it could be promoted as
well with a lesser impact on interstate activities." Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322, 336
(1979); see also Dorrance v. McCarthy, 957 F.2d 761 (10th Cir. 1992). Other significant cases
discussing the. scrutiny of state laws in view of the Commerce Clause include Wyoming v.
Oklahoma, 112 S.Ct. 789 (1992); New Energy Co. v. Limbach, 486 U.S. 269 (1988); Maine v.
Taylor, 477 U.S. 131 (1986); Minnesota v. Clover Leaf Creamery Co., 449 U.S. 456 (1981); City
of Phila. v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617 (1978); and Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137
(1970).
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develop under the Commerce Clause, 33 the Supremacy Clause, 4 and the
Property Clause.35
IlI.

WILDLIFE POLICY SHOULD BE BASED UPON SCIENTIFIC

MANAGEMENT, NOT ON PERSONAL OPINIONS OF MORALIrY

At this juncture, a relevant inquiry is which policy shall be applied to
the power to develop federal wildlife law. One area of major concern is
the issue of the continued consumptive use of renewable resources by
hunters, trappers, and fishermen under federal law, and most important,
federal policy. "Consumptive use" of game species is not a purely social
or cultural issue. Although there is a well-financed and vocal minority
in this country that would clearly like federal policy to end hunting, fishing, and trapping on "morality" grounds, the issue is clearly one of wild36
life management.
To date, professional wildlife management policy has included harvest of surplus fish and game and has been an integral part of federal
wildlife legislation and regulation. For example, when the National
Wildlife Refuge System was created, hunting, fishing, and trapping were
permitted on those refuges where it was deemed not inconsistent with its
purpose.37 The Secretary of Interior can, under regulation, "permit the
use of any area within the System for any purpose including but not limited to hunting, fishing, public recreation and accommodations whenever
he determines that such uses are compatible
with major purposes for
'38
which such areas were established.

For millions of sportsmen, these lands and waters provide the only
access to quality hunting, fishing, and trapping. The Fish and Wildlife
Service, in turn, considers such harvest as appropriate population control
33. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
34. Id art. VI, cl. 2.
35. Id.art. IV, §3, cl.
2.
36. In 1991, the Humane Society of the United States (HSUS) brought an action against
the Department of Interior in an attempt to block a white-tail deer hunt scheduled to cull the
herd on the George Mason Neck National Wildlife Refuge in Northern Virginia. The Court
perceptively observed that the suit was "animated primarily by the plaintiffs' fundamental
philosophical and public policy disagreement with the government over the wisdom, and perhaps the morality, of the sanctioned killing of wild game on public lands." Humane Soc'y of
the U.S. v. Lujan, 768 F. Supp. 360,365 (D.D.C. 1991) (emphasis added). The Court held that
such "wisdom" and "morality" cannot be substituted as to the proper use of the Refuge. Id.
37. 16 U.S.C. § 668dd (1988). President Theodore Roosevelt established Pelican Island
Refuge in 1903 by Executive Order, and it is considered the first refuge. Today, the National
Wildlife Refuge system consists of 91 million acres of both land and water in all states and five
territories.
38. Id § 668dd(d)(1)(A).
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of fish and game as well as a significant part of wildlife management.
Currently, there are approximately 1.1 million hunting and trapping expeditions, as well as five million fishing visits, taking place annually on
refuges nationwide. Of the 487 refuges, hunting is permitted in 268, of
which 149 are open to big game hunting and 142 for waterfowl gunning.
Trapping is permitted on 195 refuges and is considered "a legitimate recreational and economic activity when there are harvestable surpluses of
fur bearing mammals."3 9

Anticonsumptive use groups have consistently attacked consumptive
use of wildlife within the Refuge System.' Their efforts have borne
fruit. After a study spanning almost fifteen years, the Department of the
Interior is considering seven alternatives on the future use of our national wildlife refuges. One of those alternatives would be to eliminate
41
hunting, fishing, and trapping.
It is patently clear that the antisportsmen coalitions have imprinted
their goals on the consideration of these alternatives. The coalitions
have likewise influenced congressional action. In past sessions of Congress, legislation has been introduced to block all consumptive use of
wildlife on refuges. In addition, the protectionist lobby was successful in
having a provision placed in the Department of the Interior Appropriation bill for fiscal year 199342 to block a white-tailed deer hunt on the
George Mason Neck Wildlife Refuge, even after public comment on a
proposed rule in the Federal Register that resulted in a final rule43 that
the deer hunt was necessary to control burgeoning populations on the
Refuge and after a federal court upheld the rule. an However, through
the leadership of the Congressional Sportsmen's Caucus (CSC), an
amendment was introduced to uphold the administrative decision and
the judicial findings supporting the wildlife management decision to hold
the hunt. By a bipartisan vote of 255-160, the provision was removed
from the bill.4

This is an illustrative example of a significant wildlife policy issue that
involved all branches of the government under federal wildlife law. The
clear issue was whether supposed "moral" philosophy on the one hand,
39. FISH & WILDLIFE SERV., U.S. DEP'T OF THE INTERIOR, A PLAN FOR THE FuTruR OF
THE NATIONAL WILDLiF REFUGE SYSTEM 1-21 (1993).
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.

See, e.g., Lujan, 768 F. Supp. at 360-61.
See FISH & WILDLIFE SERV., supra note 39, at 4-91 to 4-117.
H.R. 5503, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. § 309 (1992).
50 C.F.R. §§ 32-33 (1992).
See Lujan, 768 F. Supp. at 365.
138 CONG. REc. H6433 (daily ed. July 22, 1992).
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or wildlife management on the other, should shape domestic wildlife law
and policy.
This policy dispute is also played out on the international scene,
which in turn affects federal and state law and policy. For example, the
Endangered Species Act' passed in 1973 also implemented the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna &
Flora (CITES).4 7 As the name implies, CITES is a trade treaty. However, the protectionist community has made every effort to use this forum to block consumptive use of wildlife. A case in point involves the
bobcat (Lynx rufts) and lynx (Lynx canadensis),both of which are commercially trapped in the United States.
CITES has a system of Appendices in which protected species are
assigned to one of three Appendices. Those listed in Appendix I are
considered endangered, and trade is prohibited.48 Species in Appendix
II are considered "threatened" but may be commercially traded subject
to various restrictions that such trade will not be detrimental to the survival of the species. 49 Appendix III species are those that are regulated
within each signatory nation's jurisdiction. 50
In response to a protectionist lobbying effort, the parties to CITES
passed a proposal in 1976 by Great Britain to place the entire family
Feliadaein Appendix II, stating:
All cats are potentially involved in the fur trade, and the scale of
this trade is such that all species must be considered as vulnerable, few populations now remaining unaffected. All wild species
[of cat, except the domestic cat, Felix Catus], not in Appendix I
should be on Appendix II, so that the scale of their occurrence in
trade can be monitored.51
Consequently, in the United States, bobcats and lynx suddenly became "threatened" species. This "fact" certainly came as a surprise to
46. Pub. L. No. 93-205,87 Stat. 884 (1973) (codified as amended at 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-1543
(1988)).
47. Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora,
Mar. 3, 1973, 27 U.S.T. 1087 [hereinafter CITES]. There are presently 128 party nations to
CITES. Id.
48. Id. art. II, § 1.
49. Id. art. 1, § 2.
50. Id. art. 1, § 3.
51. Convention, Berne Meeting, Doc. 1.5, Annex I, Supp. Statement 1.2. At the same
meeting of the parties, the family Lutrinae was similarly improperly listed, including the river
otter (Lutra canadensis),also commercially trapped in the United States. Id. Doc 1.5, Annex
I, Supp. Statement 2; see also 43 Fed. Reg. 15,098 (1978). Amendments to Appendices I and
H (1976), CITES, supra note 47, Doc. 1.5, Annex I, Supp. Statement 1.2 (emphasis added)
Id. Doc. 1.5, Annex I, Supp. Statement 2; see also 43 Fed. Reg. 15,098 (1978).
....
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trappers and wildlife managers because the species was never treated as
such in the United States (and Canada). The determination, moreover,
was not based upon any scientific evidence presented to the parties as
required under CITES.
Additionally, to delist a species from an Appendix, it must be shown
that the particular species experienced a "recovery. '52 This in turn created a paradox; if a species that originally had a stable population was
improperly listed as "threatened," how can you demonstrate a "recovery" to delist that species from an Appendix?
As would be anticipated, on the domestic level, this mislabeling by
CITES resulted in reactive administrative action, 53 protracted litigation,54 and, eventually, an amendment to the Endangered Species Act.
Again, all three branches of government were involved in the development of federal law and policy. The issue was finally resolved when the
United States unilaterally took the position that the species should not
have been listed as threatened and would now be domestically treated
only as a "look alike" species for monitoring purposes. The participants
at the Fourth Meeting of the Conference of the parties of CITES
acceded.56
Although the problem was eventually resolved (after a protracted
and unnecessary controversy), the CITES mislabeling shows the
problems caused when "moral" philosophy replaces responsible wildlife
management. In 1989, the bipartisan Congressional Sportsmen's Caucus
(CSC) was formed to ensure that such problems are avoided in the future and that federal wildlife law and policy stem from sound scientific
wildlife management principles. At this writing, more than forty percent
of the entire Congress are members of the bipartisan CSC.
IV.

EXPERIENCES OF UNITING THE CONTRIBUTIONS OF SPORTSMEN
wITH SCIENTIFIC MANAGEMENT HAVE BEEN SUCCESSFUL

Sportsmen are an integral part of the scientific management of wildlife. They have been, and will continue to be, the motivation for much of
the federal wildlife law as well as the financial support for wildlife programs. Such programs have been an unqualified success. For example,
52. Criteria for the Deletion of Species and Other Taxa from Appendices I and II (1976),
CITES, supra note 47, Conf. 1.2; see also 50 C.F.R. § 23 (1992).
53. 50 C.F.R. § 23 (1992).
54. See Defenders of Wildlife v. Endangered Species Scientific Auth., 659 F.2d 168 (D.C.
Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 963 (1981).

55. 16 U.S.C. § 1533(a)(2)(A) (1988).
56. 48 Fed. Reg. 37,494 (1983) (codified at 50 C.F.R. § 23 (1992)).
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sportsmen were the initiators and sponsors of the Duck Stamp in 1934.5 7
The Duck Stamp has raised millions of dollars through the annual sale of
a federal waterfowl conservation stamp. The proceeds have been used
to purchase four million acres of wetland habitat.58
Sportsmen also contribute directly to conservation efforts through an
excise tax placed upon hunting equipment. Sponsored by Senator Key
Pittman of Nevada and Representative A. Willis Robertson of Virginia
in 1937, the Federal Aid in Wildlife Restoration Act5 9 has raised over
$25 billion for wildlife management and produces approximately $160
million annually.60
Commonly referred to as the P-R Program, the excise tax assesses
eleven percent on shotguns, rifles, ammunition, and archery equipment
used in hunting, as well as ten percent on handguns. The money is distributed to state fish and game agencies for research, land acquisition
and maintenance, and general operating funds. A portion of the funds is
also used by the states for hunter education and shooting range activities. The numbers attest to the program's success: Approximately
61
700,000 new hunters complete a hunter education course annually.

A similar program was developed in 1952 for sport fishing with the
passage of the Federal Aid in Fish Restoration Act 62 (now referred to as
D-J funds), sponsored by Representative John D. Dingle, Sr., of Michigan and Senator Edwin C. Johnson of Colorado. This concept was expanded in 1984 under the Aquatic Resources Trust Fund, sponsored by
Senator Malcolm Wallop of Wyoming and Representative, now Senator,
John Breaux of Louisiana. Referred to as the Wallop-Breaux Fund,63
the money raised is collected by the Treasury and distributed to the
states by the Fish and Wildlife Service (FWS) of the Department of the
Interior. Since enactment, these programs have distributed over $1.6 bil4
lion to the states for fish conservation and restoration.6
An example of a recent action by the CSC to support the scientific
wildlife management on an international level is the letter CSC leadership wrote to the Secretary of Commerce questioning a United States
57. 16 U.S.C. § 718 (1988).
58. FISH & WILDLIFE SERV., U.S. DEP'T OF THE INTERIOR, TAE DUCK STAMP STORY
(1993).
59. 16 U.S.C. § 669 (1988).
60. FISH & WILDLIFE SERV., U.S. DEP'T OF THE INTERIOR, STATISTICAL SUMMARY FOR
FISH AND WILDLIFE REsroRATION, FiscA YEAR 1993, Table I-a (1993).
61. FISH & WILDLIFE SERV., supra note 2, at 215.

62. 16 U.S.C. § 777 (1988).
63. 26 U.S.C. § 9504 (1988).
64. See FISH & WrLDLIFE SERV., supra note 60, at Table III.
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policy that would continue to oppose whaling of certain species when the
Scientific Committee of the International Whaling Commission (IWC)
unanimously found that limited harvest of minke whales was scientifically justified. The letter stated:
Science is the fundamental basis of professional and reasonable
wildlife management that does include consumptive use of renewable wildlife resources. The U.S. should never base its domestic
or international wildlife management pronouncements based
upon perceived public opinion or, in this case, supposed Congressional opinion. Clearly, when moratoriums on the harvesting of
wildlife are scientifically justified, they should be rigidly enforced
and supported. However, when that same standard supports limited and controlled harvest, it should be supported and those nations who choose to do so be permitted without fear of criticism
or trade sanctions.65
As a matter of international federal policy, the United States could
invoke trade sanctions (under the Pelly Amendment to the Fishermen's
Protective Act) if the President finds that a nation is engaging in an action that would diminish the effectiveness of the IWC. 66 Again, this example is a serious question of "moral" wildlife opinions versus scientific
wildlife management under federal law and policy.
As a natural outgrowth of the legislative and regulatory oversight of
the CSC, the Congressional Sportsmen's Caucus Foundation (CSCF)
was chartered in the District of Columbia in 1989. The goals and purposes of the CSCF are to "provide scientific research, wildlife management, public education and conservation information.., for the wise use
of renewable resources . . . [recognizing] the role of the sportsmen in

conservation programs, policies and administration."'6 7 The nonprofit
CSCF received section 501(c)(3) status from the Internal Revenue Service, which permits contributions to be tax deductible.
The CSCF works closely with the CSC providing staff assistance, information, and research on various issues impacting the sportsmen of
this nation. One of the many projects currently being undertaken by the
CSC and the CSCF that will affect wildlife law and policy is the establishment of a Chair of Wildlife Law at a major university law school.
65. Letter from Congressmen Bill K. Brewster (Okla.) and Don Young (Ark.), Co-Chairmen, House Congressional Sportsmen's Caucus, and Senator Conrad Burns (Mont.), Chairman, Senate Congressional Sportsman's Caucus to Ronald H. Brown, Secretary of Commerce
(July 12, 1993).
66. 22 U.S.C. § 1978 (1988).
67. Articles of Incorporation (D.C.), Congressional Sportsmen's Caucus Foundation 1
(Dec. 7, 1989).
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Many law schools now have well-developed curricula in environmental
law. However, they often focus exclusively on issues dealing with clean
air, land use, clean water, and waste control, and traditionally ignore
other matters directly related to renewable wildlife resources. There
does not seem to be any specific attention to legal issues of wildlife law
and regulation. There is a real need for legal scholarship in the realm of
wildlife law, and the CSC and the CSCF are working to encourage this
development. The long-term goal is a structured curriculum in federal
and state wildlife law and policy provided to all law schools.
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CONCLUSION

This nation should be truly grateful for the farsightedness of those
who preceded us in using scientific and professional standards to develop
reasoned wildlife law and policy. However, federal wildlife law must be
constantly monitored by scientific methods and reviewed to ensure that
the protectionist policies do not endanger by mismanagement the very
wildlife and habitat they seek to protect.
More than 365 years ago, the English jurist Sir Edward Coke observed that "[r]eason is the life of the law."6 Reason, not supposed
"moral" rhetoric, should be the basis of our federal wildlife law and policy as it relates to wildlife management. Since "[f]aw is not a science but
is essentially empirical," the successful experience in wildlife management (which includes consumptive use of renewable wildlife resources)
mandates that federal wildlife laws and policy be based upon acquired
knowledge and not upon unreasoning sentiment.6 9 Our precious wildlife
deserves no less from our federal government.
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